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Abstract --  Interorganizational cooperation  in some high-tech industries is no longer confined to two- 
company alliances, but entails industry-wide alliance networks. This article examines how industry analysis 
and network analysis can be combined to provide a thorough understanding of how network positions, and the 
overall network structure, may play a  part in cooperative strategies. Industry analysis can indicate which 
properties of the network structure and network positions are congruent with the firms' cooperative strategies, 
but tells us little about how these network characteristics can be measured. Network analysis provides such 
measures, which can then be used as feedback in the industry analysis. The article illustrates this approach by 
comparing the alliance networks associated with the DRAM and RISC  microprocessor technologies. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Cooperative agreements have long been disregarded in business literature. Only recently have 
organizational theorists devoted more attention to interorganizational relationships as part of cor- 
porate strategies. The concept of interorganizational relationships was introduced in organiza- 
tional literature as far back as the late 1960s by Evan (1966) and Warren (1967) among others, 
but it was the rocketing numbers of cooperative agreements in the  1980s that made way for a 
growing body of literature on the development, structure and use of such agreements (Contractor 
and Lorange, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1990; Haklisch,  1986,  1989; Harrigan, 1985; Mowery, 1988; 
Parkhe,  1991; Ring and Van de Ven,  1994). In this paper we will use the term cooperation to 
denote cooperative agreements between partners who are not connected through (majority) own- 
ership. A cooperative agreement can be seen as an agreement which is positioned between two 
extremes: arm's length transactions on the one hand and the merger of two finns on the other 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). 
With a few notable exceptions (see, e.g. Forsgren and Johanson, 1992; Gomes-Casseres, 1994; 
Hagedoom and Schakenraad, 1990, 1992, 1993; HLkansson, 1989; Johanson etal., 1994; Nohria 
and Garcia-Pont,  1991;  Nohria and Eccles,  1992)  agreements among  companies have been 
studied on a dyadic or finn level. However, in high-tech industries where almost all incumbents 
are linked to each other by means of a network of cooperative agreements, an analysis at the level 
of the individual players or alliances is not appropriate to understand the  strategic value of 
cooperative strategies. In an environment which is characterized by a mix of cooperation and 
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competition and in which firms are embedded in a set of relationships, strategic action cannot be 
analysed properly at the individual-firm or dyadic level. Rather, such an analysis involves part or 
even the whole network to which the firm is linked. Competition no longer occurs between indi- 
vidual companies, but between groups of allies, and the strategic position of the company within 
and among alliance groups is a source of competitive advantage alongside the traditional com- 
pany-based  competencies.  The  evaluation  of the  power  of organizations  in  a  network  thus 
requires an analysis of their position in the network, their links with other players and their abil- 
ity to "control" flows of information. 
The paper combines industry analysis and network analysis in order to achieve a thorough 
understanding of how network positions and the overall network structure can play a part in coop- 
erative strategies in industries characterized by industry-wide strategic alliance (SA) networks. 
The combination is an obvious choice because the two analyses are complementary. Industry 
analysis analyses the underlying corporate strategies behind the cooperation between firms and 
unravels the reasons why there are competitive advantages to be gained from cooperation and 
group-based competition.  All this  means  that companies'  positions  within  networks,  and the 
overall network structure, are important strategic variables. Industry analysis consequently indi- 
cates which properties of the network structure and of the network positions of the allies are con- 
gruent with these cooperative strategies, but it leaves us in the dark about how to measure these 
variables.  We  therefore  require  an  additional  framework  which  specifically  addresses  these 
issues. One of the most promising statistical techniques to analyse the structure of SA networks 
is network analysis.* Network analytical tools provide reliable quantitative measures about net- 
work structures and network positions, and should thus be a valuable instrument to test whether 
inter-industry differences in competitive and cooperative strategies result in differences between 
network structures and network positions. In this way, network analysis enriches and comple- 
ments the results of the industry analysis. Hence, industry analysis and network analysis have to 
be used jointly when networks of SAs are important as part of the strategy of the collaborating 
firms. 
Values for network-analytic measures are not always readily interpretable  within a strategic 
context. The relevance of network analysis within this context is thus best illustrated by a com- 
parison between two networks with different characteristics. For this purpose, this paper focuses 
on the network-analytical similarities and differences between two networks of strategic alliances 
related to integrated circuits (IC) technologies -- the DRAM chip and the RISC microprocessor. 
We limited  ourselves  to these  two SA networks  for three  reasons. First,  they can be clearly 
defined as technologies which lead to an identifiable product (DRAM memory chips and RISC 
microprocessors).t  Second, these markets  are among the few which have a dense network of 
cooperative agreements among a limited number of players --there are 43 firms in the RISC net- 
work and 72 in the DRAM network.~  Third,  firms in the RISC market establish  cooperative 
agreements for different reasons from those applying in the DRAM market. DRAM manufac- 
*Network analysis has only recently been applied to industrial networks. For an example, see Nohria and Garcia-Pont 
(1991). For more detailed accounts of interorganizational industrial networks, see Hhkansson (1989) and Axelsson and 
Easton (1992). 
tMost studies on strategic alliance networks focus on industries or markets, but we prefer to highlight networks around 
a particular technology  because technology-based  strategic alliances cut across industry boundaries. 
~:The restriction on the number of players is dictated by the calculation capabilities of software packages for network 
analysis, and by the need to restrict the number of players in order to work out a credible industry analysis that copes 
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turers are well known for teaming up in order to deal with their enormous R&D costs, short life 
cycles and steep learning curves. 
RISC manufacturers, on the other hand, have been found to engage in cooperative agreements 
and group-based competition in order to establish a new industry standard. Differences between 
industries as regards competitive and cooperative strategies lead to differences in network struc- 
ture and in the relative network positions of the allies. By comparing the network-analytical sta- 
tistics of both networks, we could perhaps learn something about the way different competitive 
drivers and cooperative strategies are translated into differences in the network structure and the 
network positions of the focal partners. 
This paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the two technologies and the 
role of competitive and cooperative strategies in both cases. In the third section we describe the 
data and present the networks in a graphic form. The network analysis is displayed in the fourth 
section. We focus on various measures of centrality, and apply them to both technologies. The 
use of these centrality measures provides us with a better understanding of the position of indi- 
vidual companies in the overall network. Finally, the fifth section offers a summary and some 
conclusions. 
2.  DRAM AND RISC TECHNOLOGIES 
Before proceeding with the network analysis it is important to understand the role of technol- 
ogy-related strategic alliances in a particular industry. In this section we therefore provide a short 
description of the two technologies, followed by an analysis of their role in different segments of 
the electronics industry, and the reasons why companies set up strategic alliance networks. 
2.1. Strategic  alliances in the DRAM market 
The DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) is a particular general-purpose kind of 
memory chip, which continues to be the product that turns the IC industry and which accounts 
for as  much  as  a  fifth  of the  IC industry  as  a  whole.  Furthermore,  DRAMs  are  generally 
considered as a process-technology driver from which innovations can be readily diffused into 
other segments of the IC industry such as the microcontroller, microprocessor and ASIC mar- 
kets. Their strategic value is thus much greater than their market share in the IC industry would 
suggest. The production of DRAMs has been used as an example to highlight the dynamic 
relationship between  innovative leads,  economies of scale, learning by doing,  oligopolistic 
exploitation  of these  advantages,  and  international  competition  (Krugman,  1990;  Bowen, 
1991). Strategic alliances are frequently used as a tool in achieving one of these competitive 
advantages. 
One of the key characteristics of the semiconductor industry is its extremely rapidpace of tech- 
nological change. The trend towards ever-increasing integration levels puts continuous pressure 
on processing technology requirements at the different stages in the manufacturing process. As 
a result, DRAM manufacturers have to spend huge amounts of money on R&D to realize these 
technological developments, or even just to keep up with the rapid pace of technological advances 
in the memory chips market. R&D budgets typically fluctuate around  15% of company sales. 
Forecasts predict that R&D costs (and manufacturing plant costs) will soar with each introduc- 
tion of a new DRAM generation. The escalating R&D and investment costs are one of the main 
reasons why DRAM manufacturers -- even the largest ones -- are teaming up to develop and 
produce future DRAM generations. 440  G. DUYSTERS and W. VANHAVERBEKE 
DRAMs  are  mass-produced  chips  used  in  many electronic products,  which have to  be 
compatible  with  the  industry  standards  demanded  by  consumers  and  software  suppliers. 
Consequently, DRAMs are commodity items for which pricing strategies are extremely impor- 
tant as a competitive factor. The pricing of DRAMs is a complex process depending on a set of 
key features of the semiconductor industry, which determine the cost structure. 
First, the DRAM market is characterized by the succession of different families of DRAMs 
with ever-increasing reliability and performance. The shortness of the production cycle makes 
dynamic-scale economies important in two ways. First, the continually rising R&D and capital 
costs cannot be amortized by cumulative production over many years.* Second, the DRAM 
manufacturing processes are characterized by significant learning effects, which are the result 
of potential  improvements  in  the  yield rate.t  Since  the  product  cycles  are  short,  DRAM 
manufacturers always find themselves at the early, steep stage of the learning curve. 
In memory chips the highest profits come in the first year of the new chip generation, when 
supply is tight and demand high. "Time to market" is thus an important element for a successful 
strategy in this industry: it has become the driving force after the recent international technolog- 
ical cooperative agreements between major DRAM producers. Although the product life cycle 
of DRAMs is short, their development cycle is long.~ Consequently, processing technology has 
been a major source of technology transfer agreements between technological leaders and lag- 
gards in the DRAM market. Leading Japanese DRAM manufacturers have also shared their com- 
petence in CMOS manufacturing technology in exchange for design capabilities regarding micro- 
processors and other logic devices, in which U.S. firms usually excel (Haklisch, 1986; Chesnais, 
1988; ICE, 1993). 
The race between competitors to be first in the market with the next generation of DRAMs 
causes periods of over-production. The cyclical nature of the industry in combination with 
the enormous sunk costs which prevent incumbents from exiting, makes the DRAM market a 
very risky business. Dumping practices are very likely to occur during slumps, as increasing vol- 
umes make it possible to retrieve part of the sunk costs and to move down along the learning 
curve. 
Many of the vertically-integrated companies in the electronics industry invest in DRAMs not 
because it is a profitable business but for strategic reasons:§ the volume of production required 
by DRAMs propels them into the position of technology driver, stimulating (and funding the huge 
depreciation costs of) the advances in IC manufacturing technologies, which can in turn be 
applied to the production of other ICs. The volume production of DRAMs allows a chip manu- 
facturer to use the latest DRAM technology for the production of other ICs, while at the same 
time reducing the unit cost of the latter (Meth6, 1991). 
Market transactions between DRAM suppliers and system producers have often been tense. 
Problems in the market for standard DRAMs have been alleviated by means of (mutual) second- 
sourcing agreements, with a view to improving market transactions between IC manufacturers 
and electronic system companies. The raison d'@tre of second-sourcing agreements in the DRAM 
*R&D and capital costs range from 30 to 45% of DRAM sales (Mouline and Santucci, 1992, p. 25). 
#On the introduction of new DRAM family, average yield does not exceed 15%, whereas most manufacturers achieve 
an 85% yield after 24 months (Mouline and Santucci, 1992, p. 26). 
Sit can take I0 years to move a generation of chips from the development stage through to volume production. 
§The Nomura Research Institute (1992) calculated that return on investment in semiconductor operations had been less 
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market is to avoid market power being exercised by one or a few DRAM suppliers which could 
control industry output (Collins and Doodey, 1991). They are an interesting instrument for indus- 
try leaders who want to free their human and financial resources for newer and more specialized 
ICs, while assuring themselves of a reliable second source. 
In brief,  we  can  conclude  that  strategic  alliances  in  the  field  of DRAM  technology  do 
not directly  influence the competitive position of DRAM manufacturers. The link is indirect: 
strategic alliances are established in order to improve the technological position  of the partners, 
which is likely in turn to improve their competitive position. Technological progress is so fast and 
R&D costs are so huge, that even the biggest partners are teaming up and sharing technological 
skills,  although technological collaboration is usually followed by fierce competition once the 
new DRAM generation  is  commercialized.  Consequently,  we expect  to find an  SA network 
which is relatively open, i.e. one in which important companies cannot occupy network positions 
which allow them to get "control" over the network. In the next section, we focus on the SA net- 
work associated with the RISC microprocessor technology, in which companies try to improve 
their competitive position directly by means of cooperative agreements. 
2.2. Strategic alliances in the RISC microprocessor  market 
RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer) microprocessors are relatively new and are used 
mainly in workstations. Recently they have become a rising threat to established  industry stan- 
dards  in the  PC market  as  well;  Intel-based  CISC  (Complex  Instruction  Set Computer)  chip 
designs are said to be slower than the new RISC architectures and the MS-DOS operating system 
may face competition from the Unix operating system (OS), which up to now has been a common 
OS for RISC-based workstations.* The quest to establish new standards is one of the main reasons 
why RISC-designing companies are teaming up with other companies (Khazam and Mowery, 
1994). Ever since the RISC microprocessor technology became popular in the late eighties,  a 
thickening web of strategic alliances, joint ventures, technology-licensing deals and consortiums 
has been established between IC manufacturers, computer makers and software writers. 
In order to evaluate RISC microprocessor technology, we first specify RISC architectures and 
their role in microprocessor and computer markets. We then investigate the impact of an indus- 
try standard for RISC technology on the microprocessor and computer markets.t  Special atten- 
tion will be paid to the interaction between these markets, and to the relation between the search 
for a  new industry  standard and the establishment  of SAs. Finally,  some conclusions will be 
drawn and hypotheses formulated regarding the emergence of the SA network in connection with 
the RISC technology. 
In order to understand why computer manufacturers,  software writers and companies with a 
proprietary RISC architecture are eager to get control over the RISC-based computer markets, 
we have to look at the conditions for competitive success in the information technology industry 
*RISC microprocessors  offer significant cost/performance  advantages over computers based on the traditional CISC 
microprocessors. The technical characteristics of RISC designs translate themselves into economic benefits compared 
with CISC designs. Reduced and simplified instructions mean simpler circuits that need fewer transistors. Besides the 
fact that the relatively small and simple control unit in the RISC design makes the microprocessor  faster, it also implies 
a reduction in the overall design costs and design time, reducing the probability that the end product will be obsolete by 
the time the design is completed. At the same time, the number of design errors is reduced, thus improving  reliability. 
Moreover, it is easier to locate and correct errors. 
tWe omitted the implications of the introduction of RISC-microprocessors  on the software market in order to keep the 
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in general  and the  computer industry  in particular.  In almost all  cases,  architectures  in open 
systems are proprietary,* and they generate huge profits for a handful of companies which sup- 
ply components defining  and  controlling the critical  functions of the  computer or electronic 
system. Typical architectural  standard-setters  are microprocessor designers (Sun and MIPS in 
RISC, Intel in CISC),  and operating  system vendors  (Sun's or IBM's version  of UNIX and 
Microsoft's DOS or Windows NT). While most microprocessor and computer manufacturers 
have a hard time, firms which command such critical architectural control points as the system 
software and the microprocessor design, have generous after-tax margins. 
Many IT companies are developing (cooperative) strategies in face of the emergence of RISC 
technology. We discuss these strategies in several steps. First, we focus on the microprocessor 
market and then look at the implications for the computer industry. After this,  we turn to the 
battle for dominance between different operating systems. Finally, conclusions will be drawn 
with respect to the cooperative strategies and the SA network associated with RISC technology. 
Commercial RISC designs began to appear in the late eighties and RISC chips are still used pri- 
marily in workstations, which represent only a fraction of the computer industry.~ But RISC chips 
have an excellent growth potential because workstations are the fastest growing sector of the com- 
puter market. Moreover, RISC-based computers tend to penetrate a whole range of submarkets in the 
computer industry. On the one hand, flexible workstation networks based on multiple microproces- 
sors are making inroads into minicomputers and mainframes, as workstations built from RISC chips 
can perform the same computation work for a fraction of the cost when using a mainframe computer. 
On the other hand, further price reductions for RISC chips will open up the huge PC market. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that players from outside the workstation and RISC chip mar- 
kets are interested in RISC architectures. In 1992 several RISC designs were competing for market 
shares (see table in Appendix B). Since RISC chips have the potential for use in a wide range of 
computers, the emergence of an industry standard for RISC microprocessors could eventually sup- 
plant the aging PC standard, which is based on Intel Corp CISC chips. The establishment of a new 
industry standard creates positive network externalities and generates benefits for computer users, 
RISC manufacturers, and RISC-based computer makers. Thus, finns with a proprietary RISC archi- 
tecture are now aggressively promoting their architecture by means of free licensing and other 
cooperative agreements (see also Kukalis and Kanazawa, 1993; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993). 
Two early movers in the RISC market were the workstation sellers MIPS Computer Systems 
Inc and its larger rival Sun Microsystems Inc. They pushed hard for clones, to get their architec- 
ture as the basis for a new industry standard.  Sun's strategy is to license freely the design of its 
SPARC microprocessor, inviting other companies to clone its machines. Such licensing agree- 
ments are interesting to all the agents involved. They increase the probability of SPARC becom- 
ing an industry standard, which creates a larger market share and thus offsets the negative effects 
of increased  competition  between  Sun  and  its  clone  makers.$  The  latter  gain  access  to the 
*It is wrong to think that in open systems proprietary architecture control is no longer possible or desirable. Morris and 
Ferguson (1993, p. 89) argue that the opposite is true, as architectural coherence becomes even more important in an 
open systems era and non-proprietary system architectures have proved to be static and unable to keep up with rapid 
technological changes. Proprietary architectures, in contrast, are under constant competitive attack and must be vigor- 
ously defended. This dynamic engenders a very rapid rate of technological improvement. 
tAccording to Dataquest Inc. 387,000 RISC chips were sold in 1990 by all manufacturers, whereas Intel Corp's 386 and 
486 CISC chips, used in the PC market, totalled 7.5 million in unit sales. 
¢Other industry experts, however,  note that Sun and MIPS could be eclipsed by clone-makers  such as Fujitsu, Mitsubishi 
and Matsushita, which could eventually undercut prices. These clone-makers are large diversified firms, which can 
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technology, while multiple licence agreements operate at the same time as second sourcing agree- 
ments, which avoids single-supplier domination and reduces the risk of chip shortages when 
demand suddenly rises. In order to slow down acceptance of Sun's SPARC architecture, MIPS 
and Compaq spearheaded the formation of a group of 21  companies called ACE (Advanced 
Computer Environment).* The ACE systems would use the MIPS 64-bit RISC microprocessor 
(R4000) as the heart of their systems. But many things have gone wrong since ACE began in late 
1990 and the ACE consortium lost its cohesiveness. In the end, MIPS abandoned its neutrality 
when it agreed to a buy-out by workstation maker Silicon Graphic Inc (ICE, 1993; Hof, 1992b). 
These aggressive strategies on the part of both companies triggered reactions from the other 
players with  a proprietary RISC  design.  Hewlett-Packard formed PRO,  the Precision RISC 
Organization, to promote and coordinate the use of its PA-RISC architecture by developing stan- 
dards for hardware and software. IBM and Motorola, who both have their own RISC architec- 
ture, joined forces to develop the PowerPC which will power a range of products from notebooks 
to supercomputers. The venture between Apple, IBM, and Motorola is a hedging strategy by 
Apple and IBM against the growing threat of RISC chips for the PC market. DEC was late in 
developing its own Alpha RISC chip, and it still has to look for partners to promote and coordi- 
nate the use of its architecture. 
The growth of the workstation market and the attempts to standardize RISC architectures are 
threatening the comfortable position of Intel Corp in the CISC-based microprocessor market. If 
RISC-based workstations become more popular and penetrate the PC market, RISC chip pro- 
ducers may become serious challengers of Intel. Although Intel produces its own i860 RISC 
chips, its main answer to the growing RISC-chip threat consisted of speeding up the introduction 
of new families of CISC-based microprocessors. The workstation market is only about one-tenth 
the size of the PC market and is thus not important to Intel' s sales figures. However, it is an impor- 
tant market in the strategic sense, because there is always the threat that RISC chips could make 
incursions into the PC market. The future market position of Intel Corp depends on the perfor- 
mance of its future CISC families in relation to that of future RISC microprocessors (Rice, 1992; 
Hof, 1992a; Port, 1992a, b). 
Up until now, no RISC chip has established itself as a new standard. The fact that there is no 
industry leader which could impose its own design as an industry standard, implies that firms 
with proprietary RISC architectures have licensed their technology freely in order to develop an 
"installed base", which can in turn give them a competitive advantage over their rivals. As a 
result, the competition for market share in the computer industry is a direct consequence of the 
competition for dominance in the RISC chip market. This competition for market share appeared 
first in the workstation market, but it is shifting towards other segments of the computer indus- 
try  as  the  popularity  and  capabilities  of RISC  microprocessors are  growing.  The  table  in 
Appendix C shows how different microprocessor manufacturers have to win the commitment of 
a number of workstation manufacturers in order to have a substantial market share. 
Strategic alliances in the young RISC technology are largely determined by the search for 
compatible RISC architectures. Since there is no industry leader to impose its RISC architecture 
as an industry standard, different companies with competing architectures establish a network of 
strategic  alliances  (mainly  (cross-)licensing  agreements  and  consortiums)  with  IC  manu- 
*ACE  members  included  MIPS,  Compaq,  DEC,  NEC,  Microsoft,  Acer,  CDC,  Olivetti,  Prime,  Pyramid, 
Siemens/Nixdorf, Bull, Silicon Graphics, Sony, Sumitomo, Tandem, Wang, Zenith Data Systems and numerous other 
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facturers, computer makers and software writers to ensure their customer base. The result is that 
the firms involved in RISC technology are grouped into "strategic blocks" around the different 
proprietary RISC architectures. The block with the largest (combined) consumer base has the best 
chance of imposing its RISC architecture as the industry standard of the future. 
Since the relation between strategic alliances and competition for market share in the work- 
station market is a direct one, we expect that focal partners in the SA network in the RISC mar- 
ket will have a relatively tight grip on the SA network. This is in contrast to the DRAM network 
where the link between SAs and market share is only an indirect one and the search for a domi- 
nant position in the network is thus less compelling. 
The authors expect that the nature of the linkage between cooperative agreements and market 
share competition will have implications for the structure of the strategic alliance network. This 
topic is addressed in the Sections 3 and 4. 
3.  DATA AND GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION 
3.1. The data 
The data about cooperative agreements related to the RISC and the DRAM technologies are 
extracted from the MERIT-CATI database. This database contains information on almost 10,000 
cooperative agreements involving some 5000 different parent companies active in biotechnol- 
ogy, information technology, new materials or other "non-core" technologies. 
The cooperative agreements included in this network analysis all started between 1980 and 
1989.* The eighties were a turbulent  ~  period for cooperative agreements in the DRAM market, 
and the RISC technology took off only after 1985. At the time this paper was written, the CATI 
data bank had not been systematically upgraded for alliances that were established after 1989. 
The study does not thus pretend to describe the actual situation in either of the markets. The data 
sets for the following network analysis are valued graphs, where the cells of the matrices repre- 
sent the frequency of a (specified kind) of cooperative agreement between two actors. However, 
this data may have been transformed, since some network procedures require binary and/or sym- 
metric data. 
3.2. A graphical representation of the networks 
The best way to get an overview of the two cooperative networks is to plot them as in Figs 1 
and 2. The full company name and nationality of each firm are given in Appendix D. 
The two graphs reveal both similarities and differences. Both show that all firms -- with the 
exception of a few pairwise isolates -- are linked to each other in a direct or indirect way. As a result, 
the network positions of the individual firms change all the time, not only because of their own 
actions, but also because of changes in their counterparts' positions and in those of third parties with 
*Alliances in the networks under study are composed of different forms of cooperation. In the CATI database we dis- 
criminate between seven basic forms of  cooperative agreement: (a) The category "Joint R&D" which embraces both  joint 
research pacts and joint development agreements. (b) "Customer-supplier relationships" which include R&D contracts, 
co-production contracts, co-makership contracts and customer-supplier partnerships. (c) "Technical exchange agree- 
ments" (two-directional) which include technology sharing, mutual second-sourcing  and cross-licensing. (d) "One-direc- 
tional technology flow" agreements which consists of licensing and second sourcing agreements. (e) "Standardization 
and bidding consortia." Equity agreements include (f) "equity joint ventures" which enclose both the classical joint ven- 
tures as well as the research corporations, and finally (g) "equity ownership." STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN DRAM AND RISC TECHNOLOGY  445 
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Fig.  1.  Cooperative  agreements  in  RISC  technology:  1980-1989 .....  Consortia;  -  -, joint  R&D;  ---,  technology 
exchange; -- - -, customer-supplier relationship; -->, one-directional technology flow; and ...>, direct investment. 
whom they have no direct relationships (Axelsson and Easton, 1992, p. 213).* The positions of the 
companies in a network form the base for their competitive and cooperative strategies. 
The two networks are also structured differently. Figure 1 shows that the RISC network is built 
around three focal players. The two major players are the arch-rivals, MIPS Computer Systems 
and Sun Microsystems. Hewlett-Packard seems to represent the focal actor of a third but smaller 
cluster of firms. The DRAM network is more like a "chain", in which most companies are linked 
one to one. Although less obviously than in the RISC market, there are a number of subgroups in 
this network too" the group around the European big three, Siemens, Philips and SGS-Thomson; 
the U.S. Memories Consortium including the major American companies; Texas Instruments 
(and AT&T) with its South Korean and Japanese partners;  and,  finally the group including 
*Although the two cooperative networks are industry-wide, they are still sparse: the density of the adjacency matrix that 
simultaneously accounts for all ties among the actors is 0.087  for the RISC technology  and 0.043  for the DRAM 
technology. This is a general characteristic of industrial networks and can be partly explained by the exclusiveness of 
many cooperation deals and the relative inefficiency --  at least in the micro-electronics industry -- of industry-wide 
consortia (Boulton et al.,  1992; Burrows, 1992; OECD, 1991; Vickery,  1992). 446  G. DUYSTERS and W. VANHAVERBEKE 
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Fig. 2. Cooperative agreements in DRAM technology: 1980-1989.  , Equity JV; -  -  -, joint R&D; - - -, technology 
exchange; .... customer-supplier relationship; ---->, one-directional technology flow; and .-.>, direct investment. 
Mitsubishi. Mitsubishi and Intel developed cooperative agreements that cut across the whole net- 
work, which gives them freedom of action since they are not locked into any one of the subgroups. 
It is also important to mention the existence of several consortiums which determine to a con- 
siderable extent the shape of the network in both markets. There were three consortia in the RISC 
market during the late eighties: (a) the Sparc Vendor Council,* (b) the Systems Performance 
Evaluation Cooperation (SPEC),t and the 88-Open.$ They were started in order to establish 
industry standards and to increase compatibility primarily between allies, but also between rivals. 
The consortia in the DRAM  market are mostly joint development agreements.  In  the early 
*The Sparc Vendor Council includes Bipolar, Fujitsu, LSI Logic, Texas Instruments, Cypress, Matsushia and Philips. 
All these firms have licensing agreements with Sun Microsystems for its SPARC technology. 
tSPEC intended to develop industry-wide standard benchmarks for (32-bits) RISC architecture computers. It includes 
the major companies -- Sun Microsystems, MIPS Computer Systems, Apollo and Hewlett-Packard. 
SThe 88-Open Consortium is a  consortium of computer suppliers supporting Motorola's 88000 RISC processors. It 
includes Motorola, Unisoft, Apollo, Hewlett-Packard, NCR, Tektronix and Data General, and it intends to foster source 
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eighties NTT, Fujitsu and NEC had agreements to develop the 128 Kb and the 256 Kb DRAM 
chip.  Similar agreements existed between  Samsung,  Hyundai and Lucky Goldstar in the late 
eighties in order to develop the 4 Mb and 16 Mb DRAM chip. There were also consortia between 
American DRAM producers. One of them was US Memories* which was established in 1989, 
but was broken up a  year later. Another U.S. consortium in Sematech which tries to improve 
semiconductor manufacturing  technologies. Since Sematech's interest is directed towards the 
semiconductor equipment industry rather than the DRAM market itself, it is not included in the 
DRAM SA network. 
4.  CENTRALITY MEASURES 
In this section different measures of point centrality and graph centrality are shown and dis- 
cussed for both markets. Examining the point centralities is one way of getting reliable and quan- 
tiffed measures of the position of each partner with respect to the overall structure of the net- 
work.t A comparison of centrality measures between the RISC and the DRAM SA networks will 
indicate possible differences in the value and strategic use of alliances in both networks. 
4.1. Point centrality and graph centrality measures 
Point centrality can be measured in several ways.:~ A  first indicator (CD) measures point cen- 
trality as a function of the degree of a point§ -- the mathematical formulae for the centrality mea- 
sures are shown in Appendix A. A  second indicator, closeness-based point centrality (Cc), mea- 
sures the centrality of a point by summing the geodesic distances from that point to all other points 
in the graph.~ Another centrality measure, the so-called betweenness centrality (CB), is based 
upon the frequency with which a point falls between pairs of other points on geodesic paths con- 
necting them.II 
In the case of valued graphs there is also a  centrality measure  based upon maximal flow 
betweenness (Cp): the information flow between two points is not the direct flow between adja- 
cent points, but the overall flow between pairs of points along all the paths that connect them. 
The information flow between two points thus depends on the capacity of all the channels of com- 
munication on all the paths that connect them. A  channel is defined in turn as the value of the 
connection linking two points, and it determines the capacity or maximum amount of informa- 
tion that can be passed between them.** 
Graph  centralization,  or the  centrality of an  entire  network,  measures  the  tendency  of a 
single point to be more central than all other points in the network. Consequently, graph central- 
ity measures are based on differences in point centralities and, more precisely, on the difference 
*US Memories included IBM, Hewlett-Packard, DEC, Intel, National Semiconductor, AMD and LSI Logic. 
tDepending on the research questions, other network analytical tools can also be used. 
SWe confine our attention to a few centrality measures. Centrality measures based on eigenvectors, as developed by 
Bonacich (1972), and the Stephenson and Zelen (1989) information centrality measure have been left out of the follow- 
ing analysis. 
§Tbe degree of a point, p~, is the count of the number of other points, pj (i ¢:j), to which it is adjacent and with which it is 
therefore in direct contact (Freeman, 1979, p. 219). 
~rbe geodesic is the shortest path linking a given pair of points. 
I  IDegree  centrality can handle both symmetric and asymmetric valued graphs. In this section we treat a matrix in a sym- 
metric way, but this will change when we examine in- and out-degrees. Closeness centrality is always based on symmet- 
ric binary graphs, while betweenness centrality can handle both symmetric and asymmetric binary graphs. 
**Flow betweenness works with valued graphs. (These indicators are explained in the following paragraphs.) For further 
details on this centrality measure, see Freeman et al. (1991 ). 448  G. DUYSTERS and W. VANHAVERBEKE 
between the centrality of the most central point and that of all others (Freeman, 1979, p. 227) -- 
see formula equation A9 in Appendix A. In other words, graph centralization measures the aver- 
age difference between the network positions of focal and peripheral players. 
4.2.  Centrality in the RISC network 
The point and graph centrality measures of the strategic alliances network in the RISC tech- 
nology are shown in Table 1. These measures are relative or normalized measures, so that com- 
parison between the RISC and DRAM SA networks is straightforward. 
The simplest conception of point centrality is CD, i.e. centrality as a function of the degree of 
a point. A point with a high CD value is considered to be "in the thick of things", so that in some 
sense it is a focal point playing an essential role in the network. A point with a low degree is iso- 
lated from most other actors in the network and will play only a marginal role. The two finns with 
a high degree centrality are MIPS Computer Systems Inc and Sun Microsystems Inc. Their focal 
position is the result of their active policy of RISC-architecture licensing. Other firms with a 
relatively high CD-value are Hewlett-Packard, who acquired Apollo in 1990, Texas Instruments, 
LSI Logic and Philips. The last three companies belong to the "cluster" of firms that have a 
licensing agreement with Sun Microsystems. The high ranking of these firms is an indication of 
the network density of that "cluster". Hewlett-Packard/Apollo, on the other hand, is the focal 
partner of a group of firms that constitute a third cluster beside those of MIPS Computer Systems 
and Sun Microsystems. Most licensees are located at the lower part of Table 2 and play only a 
marginal role in the network. 
The second column in Table 1 represents the closeness-based index: the centrality of a point 
is measured by summing the geodesic distances from that point to all other points in a graph. 
Again,  MIPS Computer Systems, Sun  Microsystems, and Hewlett-Packard have the highest 
closeness centralities, but their value is of the same order of that of other companies. This implies 
that the R/SC alliance network exhibits a number of loops or circles; the central loop is the tri- 
angle between Sun, MIPS and Hewlett-Packard, but other companies also have direct links with 
companies in another cluster. The result is that the variance of the distance of the geodesics across 
the firms is relatively small. Exceptions are Olivetti, Schlumberger, VLSI and Intergraph, which 
have an extremely low value for this indicator, as their alliances are isolated from the main net- 
work. The low variance in the Cc values are mainly the result of the SPEC consortium which 
intended to develop industry-wide standard benchmarks for (32-bits) RISC architecture comput- 
ers.  It  involves  an  agreement between  the  major  companies  --  Sun  Microsystems,  MIPS 
Computer Systems, Apollo and Hewlett-Packard --  and in  this  way it transforms the  three 
strategic blocks into a connected network. 
The betweenness centrality index is based on the frequency with which a  company lands 
between pairs of other companies on the geodesic path between them. A firm that lands on the 
shortest path between two other firms, has a  potential for control.  Sun Microsystems, MIPS 
Computer Systems and Hewlett-Packard have a clear potential for such control. Their value is 
even higher for CF, i.e. when we take all paths into account, which confirms in turn the presence 
of cycles in  the network.*  Some finns  have bridge  functions,  such  as CDC  and LSI-Logic 
*"Connected graphs without cycles have only one path -- a single geodesic -- linking any pair of points. When there 
are no alternative paths, the counts tabulated by the betweenness measures must equal the flows of the flow-based 
measures. However,  when cycles are present, CF and CB will differ. This is because the CB measures  record flow only 
along geodesics, while the CF measures  are responsive  to all paths along which information  can flow. The two kinds of 
measures will therefore produce different results for any graph that contains any cycles." (Freeman et al., 1991, pp. 
150-151). STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN DRAM AND RISC TECHNOLOGY 
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Company*  Co  Cc  CB  CF 
SUN-MICR  61.90  18. l 0  25.53  30,90 
MIPS-CS  42.86  18.03  18.35  36.58 
H-P  26.19  17.57  12.22  24,22 
TI  23.81  16.15  2.57  6.19 
APOLLO  21.43  17.43  6.51  11.86 
LSILOGIC  21.43  16.87  1.63  2.15 
PHILIPS  21.43  16.15  2.45  9.92 
BIPOLAR  19.05  16.09  1.12  1.99 
CYPRESS  19.05  16.09  0.02  1.52 
FUJITSU  19.05  16.09  0.02  1.14 
MATSUSHT  19.05  16.09  0.02  1.40 
MOTOROLA  16.67  15.61  1.34  2.46 
DATA GEN  14.29  15.56  0.00  1.42 
NCR  14.29  15.56  0.00  1.42 
TEKTRONX  14.29  15.56  0.00  1.42 
UNISOFT  14.29  15.56  0.00  1.42 
PRIME  4.76  16.41  0.00  0.00 
CDC  4.76  15.97  0.76  2.98 
AMD  4.76  15.67  0.51  6.78 
NEC  4.76  15.67  0.00  0.00 
UNISYS  4.76  15.61  0.00  0.00 
XEROX  4.76  15.61  0.00  0.00 
DEC  4.76  15.56  0.00  0.00 
KOBUTA  4.76  15.56  0.00  0.00 
ARETE  2.38  15.61  0.00  0.00 
AT T  2.38  15.61  0.00  0.00 
LUCKY G  2.38  15.61  0.00  0.00 
METAFLOW  2.38  15.6l  0.00  0.00 
TOSHIBA  2.38  15.61  0.00  0.00 
INTEG DT  2.38  15.56  0.00  0.00 
PERF SEM  2.38  15.56  0.00  0.00 
RACAL  2.38  15.56  0.00  0.00 
SIEMENS  2.38  15.56  0.00  0.00 
SILICONG  2.38  15.56  0.00  0.00 
STARDENT  2.38  15.56  0.00  0.00 
TANDEM  2.38  15.56  0.00  0.00 
HITACHI  2.38  15.22  0.00  0.00 
SODIMA  2.38  13.77  0.00  0.00 
SGS/THOMS  2.38  13.73  0.00  0.00 
INTERGRA  2.38  2.38  0.00  0.00 
OLIVETTI  2.38  2.38  0.00  0.00 
SCHLUMB  2.38  2.38  0.00  0.00 
VLSI  2.38  2.38  0.00  0.00 
Mean  10.52  14.60  1.70  3.39 
S.D.  12.18  4.00  5.00  7.99 
Network centralization  53.89  7.26  24.40  33.98 
*See Appendix D for full company names. 
between  MIPS  Computer  Systems  and  Sun  Microsystems, AMD  and  Philips  between  Sun 
Microsystems and Hewlett-Packard, or Motorola between Hewlett-Packard and Thomson. 
4.3. Centrality in the DRAM network 
The  same centrality indices are  calculated for the DRAM  technology. They  are  shown in 
Table 2  and will be discussed in a comparison with the data in Table 1. 450  G. DUYSTERS and W. VANHAVERBEKE 
Table 2. Point and network centrality measures for the DRAM technology 
Company*  CD  Cc  CB  C~ 
AMD  18.31  8.05  11.31  33.52 
TI  18.31  8.04  8.76  8.18 
NATSEMI  16.90  7.92  10.08  12.16 
LUCKY_G  15.49  8.00  12.49  16.49 
AT&T  14.08  7.73  13.38  26.37 
SIEMENS  14.08  7.73  6.79  10.71 
LSILOGIC  12.68  8.05  14.61  9.79 
SGS THOM  12.68  8.03  11.89  15.11 
INTEL  12.68  7.87  4.81  5.66 
MITSUBIS  11.27  8.17  20.11  25.53 
IBM  11.27  7.82  2.03  3.51 
TOSHIBA  11.27  7.80  10.00  12.40 
PHILIPS  11.17  7.73  3.47  4.70 
H/P  9.86  7.91  2.31  1.37 
SAMSUNG  9.86  7.77  2.30  2.74 
DEC  8.45  7.81  0.00  0.82 
HYUNDAI  8.45  7.74  1.01  2.26 
MICRON_T  8.45  7.58  2.47  3.24 
TANDY  7.04  7.79  3.82  0.43 
CHIPS  T  7.04  7.79  5.09  5.77 
FUYO  5.63  7.73  1.25  2.12 
KAYPRO  5.63  7.72  0.00  0.32 
DELLCOMP  5.63  7.72  0.00  0.32 
MOTOROLA  5.63  7.58  0.71  2.54 
CYPRESS  5.63  7.55  2.03  3.17 
FUJITSU  4.23  7.69  2.62  2.28 
NMB  4.23  7.54  2.03  2.79 
HITACHI  4.23  7.53  0.00  0.00 
NEC  2.82  7.63  4.03  4.61 
VLSI  2.82  7.56  2.54  4.62 
SONY  2.82  7.54  0.00  0.00 
SAGEM  2.82  7.49  0.00  1.18 
GE  2.82  7.33  1.09  0.57 
GEC  2.82  7.27  2.03  2.59 
OLIVETFI  2.82  7.27  1.07  0.74 
PARADIGM  2.82  7.26  0.00  0.00 
RICOH  2.82  7.12  1.31  2.38 
COMMODOR  2.82  7.12  0.00  0.00 
MATRA_MHS  2.82  7.10  0.00  0.00 
NITRON  2.82  1.41  0.00  0,00 
UNI_SEMI  2.82  1.41  0.00  0,00 
WESTINGH  1.41  7.64  0.00  0,00 
ACER  1.41  7.53  0.00  0,00 
SHARP  1.41  7.53  0.00  0.00 
ITAN  1.41  7.52  0.00  0.00 
DOCAS  1.41  7.52  0.00  0.00 
SCHLUMB  1.41  7.50  0.00  0.00 
STC  1.41  7.43  0.00  0.00 
XICOR  1.41  7.38  0.00  0.00 
NCR  1.41  7.33  0.00  0.00 
MATSUSHT  1.41  7.32  0.00  0.00 
EXEL_MIC  1.41  7.29  0.00  0.00 
INT_CT  1.41  7.27  0.00  0.00 
WYSE  1.41  7.26  0.00  0.00 
XEROX  1.41  7.26  0.00  0.00 
FORMOS  P  1.41  7.26  0.00  0.00 
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Company*  CD  Cc  CB  CF 
XYLOGICS  1.41  7.26  0.00  0.00 
NTT  1.41  7.22  0.00  0.00 
AMSTRAD  1.41  7.12  0.00  0.00 
CROSS TR  1.41  7.09  0.00  0.00 
ERSO  1.41  6.91  0.00  0.00 
FORCE C  1.41  6.85  0.00  0.00 
APPMICRS  1.41  6.85  0.00  0.00 
PANATEC  1.41  6.72  0.00  0.00 
BULL  1.41  1.41  0.00  0.00 
CRAY  1.41  1.41  0.00  0.00 
G2_INC  1.41  1.41  0.00  0.00 
HARRIS  1.41  1.41  0.00  0.00 
UNISYS  1.41  1.41  0.00  0.00 
GAZELLE  1.41  1.41  0.00  0.00 
TRIQUINT  1.41  1.41  0.00  0.00 
UN_TECHN  1.41  1.41  0.00  0.(X) 
Mean  5.01  6.67  2.33  3.21 
S.D.  4.80  2.13  4.25  6.48 
Network centralization  13.68  3.06  252.58  30.74 
*See Appendix D for full company names. 
In contrast with the RISC network where a few focal firms have an extremely high CD value, 
the distribution of degree-based centrality values among companies in the DRAM market is more 
evenly spread.* The degree centrality of Sun Microsystems is 5.9 times the mean, and that of 
MIPS  Computer  Systems  is  4.1  times  the  mean,  while  this  figure  for  AMD  and  Texas 
Instruments, the two finns with the highest degree centrality in the DRAM network, is only 3.7. 
Hence, it can be argued that the DRAM SA network has a more "open" character than the RISC 
network: while 12 firms play a central role in the DRAM network, we have only two or three cen- 
tral players in the RISC case. 
The closeness-based centrality index, Co shows values much lower on average than those in 
the RISC network.t The focal firms do not have the same potential for control as in the RISC net- 
work. The structure of the network is such that many firms are interconnected with each other, 
but there is no hub-spoke structure as in the RISC network, giving some companies a  strong 
potential for control over the others. The abundance of cycles in the DRAM alliance network 
implies that most companies can avoid the potential control of another company to which they 
are linked. 
The betweenness centrality of some firms in the DRAM market reaches the same level as the 
three focal companies in the RISC network. Companies such as Mitsubishi, AMD, AT&T, LSI 
Logic, Lucky-Goldstar and SGS-Thomson have high values for Ca and their value for Cr is even 
higher, with the exception of LSI Logic. These high values indicate strategic alliances that cut 
across the whole network, improving significantly their centrality in terms of betweenness. 
The difference in network structure and the network positions of focal partners in both SA net- 
works can be partly explained by the different goals of the cooperative strategies behind the tech- 
nology alliances. In the RISC network the search for a new industry standard and the resulting 
*The ratio of the mean over the standard deviation is 0.86 for the RISC market and 1.04 for the DRAM market. 
+The mean in the RISC network is 2.19 times higher. 452  G. DUYSTERS and W. VANHAVERBEKE 
group-based competition are the drivers behind most SAs, such as the licensing of RISC archi- 
tectures: this economic drive almost by definition implies the clustering of firms around a few 
focal actors who have a fairly strong grip on the other players. The result is that competition is 
no longer company-based but is group-based. Strategic alliances in the DRAM case, on the other 
hand, are to a large extent linked to process technologies and manufacturing capabilities, with 
R&D joint ventures and cross-licensing for second-sourcing as the main SA modes. Such agree- 
fnents do not have a direct impact on the competitive position of the partners on the DRAM mar- 
ket, and in most cases allies are free to cooperate with third parties on other technological issues. 
In short, the centrality measures show that the DRAM network is much more "open" than the 
RISC network. In the latter each firm is linked to a focal partner which is the central player in the 
group-based market share competition. Consequently, the RISC network can be neatly divided 
into three strategic blocks.* Within each of these, relations are abundant, but relations across 
them are scarce because of their exclusivity. In the DRAM network, agreements are not exclu- 
sive or they involve only a few partners, with the result that many strategic alliances cut across 
the network. The DRAM network is loosely structured and does not divide the set of companies 
into clearly identifiable strategic blocks. 
This is exactly what we would expect from the industry analysis in Section 3. The competi- 
tion between different RISC  architectures leads  to clearly identifiable strategic blocks,  and 
among these cooperation is excluded (almost) by definition. Most cooperative agreements con- 
cerning DRAM chips are process technology-based and have no direct relationship with market 
share competition. Usually, the agreements relate to two or three companies only, and often con- 
cern several distinct spheres of exchange. The DRAM network can therefore be expected to con- 
sist of a criss-cross of SAs without well-defined strategic blocks. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have argued that our present understanding of cooperative agreements could 
be substantially improved by adopting a network approach, instead of using the traditional way 
of analysing cooperative agreements on a dyadic level or by focusing on the set of SAs of a focal 
firm. In a growing number of industries interorganizational collaboration is no longer confined 
to two-company alliances; rather, groups of companies link themselves together into networks of 
alliances in order to command competitive advantages which individual companies or two-com- 
pany alliances cannot achieve. The result is the emergence of group-based competition between 
"blocks" of allied companies. Focusing only on company-based advantages or on the set of SAs 
of only one focal company is not adequate for analysing the competitive position of firms in 
industries with industry-wide SA networks. The competitive positions of companies in such 
industries are also largely determined by the whole SA network structure, and by their position 
within it. 
Industry analysis can unravel group-based advantages and the reasons why companies are 
teaming up in strategic alliances. It can also focus on the role that SAs play in corporate strate- 
gies and on the consequences of this for the network positions of the focal firms and for the struc- 
ture of the industry-wide network. However, industry analysis says nothing about how compa- 
nies' positions within networks or the overall network structure within particular industries can 
*"Strategic blocks" are based on similarities in the strategic linkages between companies (see Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 
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be measured. This article has illustrated how network analytical tools can be used in order to find 
reliable measures. Network analysis is thus a valuable tool that enriches and complements the 
results of the industry analysis. 
A  comparison has been made here between the two networks associated with RISC micro- 
processor technology and DRAM chip technology. These two networks were chosen because 
cooperative strategies regarding both technologies are based on completely different economic 
drivers, so that network positions and the overall network structure  could be expected to differ 
significantly between the two networks. 
The network analysis shows that significant differences  do exist between the two SA net- 
works, not only in terms of network structure but also as regards the role played by specific com- 
panies within the networks. The network associated with RISC technology is clearly structured 
around focal players, who in turn have consortia-like agreements among themselves as regards 
industry standards. Most agreements in the DRAM network are not exclusive, or they involve 
only a few partners.  The result is that the DRAM  network, unlike RISC,  is basically  loosely 
structured and can be described as a criss-cross of SAs without any well-defined strategic blocks. 
These differences between the structures of the two SA networks reflect the different roles SAs 
play in corporate strategies in the two technologies. The various centrality measures have shown 
that network positions and overall network structure can be measured in a reliable and quantita- 
tive way, so that the results can be used as feedback in the industry analysis. Naturally, central- 
ity measures represent only one of several possible tools for analysing networks, but the use of 
simple centrality measures has already revealed a picture which goes beyond that which an analy- 
sis on a dyadic or individual firm level can give. Industry analysis and network analysis thus com- 
plement each other, increasing our understanding of cooperative strategies in high-tech industries 
characterized by industry-wide SA networks. 
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS OF CENTRALITY MEASURES* 
Point centrality  measures 
Freeman' s (1979) measure of degree centrality (Co) is defined as the count of number of adjacencies for 
a point p~: 
n 
Co(Pk) =  Y. a(pi, Pk),  (A1) 
i=1 
where a(p~, Pk) =  1 if and only ifp~ and Pk are connected by a line; otherwise, a(p;, Pk) =  O. 
A relative measure of degree-based point centrality for a given point Pk is defined as follows: 
n 
Y  a(p;, m) 
i=1 
l 
Co  (Pk) = 
n--1 
(A2) 
where n -  1 is the maximum number of points to which a point Pk Can be connected. 
A closeness-based measure of centrality varies inversely with d(p;, p~), the number of edges in the geo- 
desic linking p~ and Pk 
Cc(Pk)= {1/  ~  d(p;,pk)}.  (A3) 
i=1 
However, Cc is only meaningful for a connected graph. In an unconnected graph every point is at infi- 
nite distance from at least one other point. The relative centrality of point Pk can be defined as: 
n 
l 
Cc(Pk) =  {(n- 1)/  Y,  d(p,,p~)}.  (A4) 
i=1 
Betweenness-based centrality can be measured as follows: 
n  n  g,~ (Pk) 
CB(Pk) =  E  Y  --,  (A5) 
i  <j  g,~ 
where n is the number of points in the graph, g~i the number of geodesics linking Po and pj and g~i(Pk) is the 
number of geodesics linking p~ and pj that contain p~. The relative measure of betweenness centrality is: 
;  n  n  gij (Pk) 
CB (pk) =  {2  ]~  Y.  /(nZ-3n+2)}.  (A6) 
i  <j  g~j 
A centrality measure for valued graphs based on a maximum amount of information flow between two 
points was developed by Freeman et al. (1991). Let m 0 be the maximum flow from a point p~ to another pr 
And let m o (Pk) be the maximum flow from p; to pj that passes through point Pk" Then the degree to which 
the maximum flow between all unordered pair of points depends on Pk, where i <j and i ~:j ~: k is: 
n  n 
CF (Pk) =  £  Y~  m~ (Pk).  (AT) 
i  <j 
*For a more detailed discussion of centrality measures, we refer the reader to Bonacich (1987), Freeman (1979) and 
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If the previous formula is divided by the total flow between all pairs of points where Pk is neither a source 
nor a sink, we can define a relative measure of flow betweenness as follows: 
n  n 
E  E  mo (Pk) 
i  <j 
CF  I (p~) -  (A8) 
n  n 
E  E  m0 
i  <j 
Connected graphs without cycles have only one path -- a single geodesic -- linking any pair of points, 
and thus have the same values for Ca and CF. When cycles are present these two centrality measures differ 
because Ca measures record flow only along the geodesics, while the Cv measures are responsive to all paths 
along which information can flow. 
Graph centrality measures 
When the concept of "centrality" is applied to whole networks, it refers to differences in point central- 
ity. If n is the number of points, C~ (p~) one of the point centralities defined above, and Cx (P) the largest of 
Cx (P~) for any point in the network, then: 
n 
E  (C ~*) -- C  (P,)) 
i=1 
C~ =  (A9) 
n 
max  E(G  (p*) -  G(P,)) 
i=1 
is Freeman's (1979) index for graph centrality. The denominator represents the maximum possible sum of 
differences in point centrality for a graph with n points. This maximum usually coincides with the point cen- 
trality of a star. 
When (A9) is applied to the point centralities, as we have defined them above, we get the following for- 
mulas for network centrality. 
The degree-based network centrality measure can be formulated as follows: 
n 
E  (C~ (p*) -- c D (Pi)) 
i=1 
CD =  (A10) 
n 2  --  3n + 2 
Similarly, we can write the closeness-based network centrality measure as follows: 
n 
E  (Cc ~*) -  Cc (pi)) 
i=1 
c~= 
(n  2 -  3n + 2)/(2n -  3) 
The betweenness-based graph centrality measure can be written as follows: 
(All) 
n 
E  (c~ (p*) -  c 8 Co/)) 
i=1 
Ce = 
n 3 -  4n 2 +  5n -  2 
Finally, the flow betweenness graph centrality measure can be expressed in the following way: 
(A12) 
C F -~ 
n 
E  (cF (v*) -  c~ ~)) 
i=1 
n-1 
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Company  Architecture  Chip  Manufacturers* 
Hewlett-Packard  Co (U.S.)  PA  PA-4  Hitachi (J) 
Samsung (S.K.) 
PA-7100  HP (U.S.) (captive) 
Oki (J) 
Mitsubishi (J) (captive) 
Winbond (Taiwan) 
Intel Corp (U.S.)  i860  860XP  Intel (U.S.) 
Apple/IBM/Motorola  (U.S.)  Power PC  Power PC 601  IBM (U.S.) 
Motorola (U.S.) 
Motorola  88000  Motorola (U.S.) 
MIPS Computer Systems (U.S.)  R3000  IDT (U.S.) 
R4000 
R4400 
Sun Microsystems (U.S.)  SPARC  HyperSPARC 
Viking 
DEC Corp. (U.S.)  Alpha 
Intergraph (U.S.)  Clipper 
Acorn Computers (U.S.)  ARM 
AT&T (U.S.)  Hobbit 





LSI Logic (U.S.) 













Matsushita (J) (captive) 





Motorola (U.S.) (foundry) 
Fujitsu (J) (foundry) 
Sanyo (J) 
VLSI Technology (U.S.) 
GEC Plessey (U.K.) 
Hitachi (J) 
NEC (J) 
National Semiconductors (U.S.) 
Sources: IEEE Spectrum (April 1991, p, 61), (July 1992, p. 28); ICE (1992, pp. 6-33), (1993, pp. 6-34). 
*J, Japan; S.K., South Korea; G. Germany; NL, The Netherlands. 458  G. DUYSTERS  and W. VANHAVERBEKE 
APPENDIX C: REPRESENTATIVE  SAMPLE OF COMMERCIALLY  AVAILABLE 
WORKSTATIONS  IN THE U.S.A. IN 1991 
Central processing  Workstation 
unit  manufacturer 
CISC 
Cypress  Cypress CY7C601  Mars Microsystems Inc. 
Solarix Systems 
Star Technologies Inc. 
SGS-Thomson  Inmos T800  EE International Computer Corp. 
Intel  Inte180386  Mars Microsystems Inc. 
Intel 80486  Acer America Corp. 
American Mitac Corp. 
Arche Technologies Inc. 
AT&T Computer Systems 
Compaq Computer Corp. 
Copam USA Inc. 
Dell Computer Corp. 
Dolch Computer Systems 
EE International Computer Corp. 
Fortron/Source Corp. 
Laser Digital Inc. 
Microway Inc. 
Micro Express 
Mobius Computer Corp. 
NCR Corp. 
Polywell Computers Inc. 
Tangent Computer Inc. 
TeleCAD 
TeleVideo Systems Inc. 
Wyse Technology Inc. 
Motorola  Motorola 68030  Apple Computer Inc. 
Commodore Business Machines Inc. 
Motorola 68040  Concurrent Computer Corp. 




Intel  Intel i860 
Intergraph  Intergraph C300 
LSI Logic  LSI Logic Sparkit 20 
LSI Logic 64801 
LSI Logic L64084 
MIPS  MIPS R3000 
Sun  Panasonic MN 10501 
Sparc Engine 
Sun Sparc 
International Business Machines Corp. 
Visual Information Technologies Inc. 
EE International Computer Corp. 
Intergraph Corp. 
CompuAdd Corp. 
Tatung Science and Technology Inc. 
Twinhead International Corp. 
Control Data Corp. 
Digital Equipment Corp. 
Evans & Sntherland Design Systems Division 
MIPS Computer Systems Inc. 
Silicon Graphics Inc. 
Sony Microsystems Co. 
Stardent Computer Inc. 
Solbourne Computer Inc. 
Ramtek Corp. 
RDI Inc. 
Sun Microsystems Inc. 
Source: Adapted from IEEE Spectrum, April 1991, pp. 40-46. STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN DRAM AND RISC  TECHNOLOGY  459 
APPENDIX D: COMPANIES  INCLUDED IN THE RISC AND DRAM  SA NETWORK 
Name  Code  Country 
DRAM  network 
1  Acer  ACER  Taiwan 
2  Advanced Micro Devices Inc.  AMD  U.S.A. 
3  American Telephone & Telegraph Co.  AT&T  U.S.A. 
4  Amstrad Pie.  AMSTRAD  U.K. 
5  Applied Micro Systems Corp.  APPMICRS  U.S.A. 
6  Groupe Bull  BULL  France 
7  Chips and Technologies  CHIPS_T  U.S.A. 
8  Commodore  COMMODOR  U.S.A. 
9  Cray Research Inc.  CRAY  U.S.A. 
10  Cross & Trecker Corp.  CROSS_TR  U.S.A. 
11  Cypress Semiconductor  CYPRESS  U.S.A. 
12  Dell Computer  DELLCOMP  U.S.A. 
13  Docas  DOCAS  Brazil 
14  Erso  ERSO  Republic of China 
15  Exel microelectronics  EXEL_MIC  U.S.A. 
16  Force Computers Inc.  FORCE_C  U.S.A. 
17  Fujitsu Ltd.  FUJITSU  Japan 
18  Fuyo Group  FUYO  Japan 
19  Digital Equipment Corp. (DEC)  DEC  U.S.A. 
20  Formosa Plastic Corp.  FORMOS_P  U.S.A. 
21  Gazelle microcircuits  GAZELLE  U.S.A. 
22  General Electric  GE  U.S.A. 
23  General Electric Company  GEC  U.K. 
24  G-2 Inc.  G21NC  U.S.A. 
25  Harris Corp.  HARRIS  U.S.A. 
26  Hewlett-Packard  Co.  H-P  U.S.A. 
27  Hitachi Ltd.  HITACHI  Japan 
28  Hyundai  HYUNDAI  South Korea 
29  Int. CMOS Technology  INT_CT  U.S.A. 
30  Integrated Device Technology  INTEG-DT  U.S.A. 
31  International Business Machines  IBM  U.S.A. 
32  Intel Corp.  INTEL  U.S.A. 
33  ltan  ITAN  Brazil 
34  Kaypro Corp.  KAYPRO  U.S.A. 
35  LSI Logic  LSILOGIC  U.S.A. 
36  Lucky Goldstar Ltd.  LUCKY_G  South Korea 
37  Matra MHS  MATRA_MHS  France 
38  Matsushita Elect. Industrial Co. Ltd.  MATSUSHT  Japan 
39  Micron Technology Inc.  MICRON  T  U.S.A. 
40  Mitsubishi Electric Corp.  MITSUBIS  Japan 
41  Motorola Inc.  MOTOROLA  U.S.A. 
42  National Cash Register Corp. (NCR)  NCR  U.S,A. 
43  National Semiconductor Corp.  NATSEMI  U.S,A. 
44  NEC Corp.  NEC  Japan 
45  NMB Semiconductor  NMB  Japan 
46  Nitron  NITRON  U.S.A. 
47  NTT  NTT  Japan 
48  Olivetti SpA.  OLIVETTI  Italy 
49  Panatec R&D Corp.  PANATEC  U.S.A. 
50  Paradigm Technologies Inc.  PARADIGM  U.S.A. 
51  Philips N.V.  PHILIPS  Netherlands 
52  Ricoh  RICOH  Japan 
53  Sagem  SAGEM  France 
54  Samsung  SAMSUNG  South Korea 
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55  Scblumberger N.V.  SCHLUMB  U.S.A. 
56  Sharp  SHARP  Japan 
57  Siemens A.G.  SIEMENS  Germany 
58  Sony  SONY  Japan 
59  STC  STC  U.K. 
60  Tandy  TANDY  U.S.A. 
61  Texas Instruments Inc.  TI  U.S.A. 
62  Thomson S.A. (SGS-Thomson)  THOMSON  France/Italy 
DRAM network 
63  Toshiba Corp.  TOSHIBA  Japan 
64  Triquint  TRIQUINT  U.S.A. 
65  Unisys Corp.  UNISYS  U.S.A. 
66  Universal Semiconductor  UNI  SEMI  U.S.A. 
67  United Technologies Corp. (UTV)  UN_TECHN  U.S.A. 
68  VLSI Technology Inc.  VLSI  U.S.A. 
69  Westinghouse  WESTINGH  U.S.A. 
70  Wyse  WYSE  U.S.A. 
71  Xerox Corp.  XEROX  U.S.A. 
72  Xicor  XICOR  U.S.A. 
73  Xylogics  XYLOGICS  U.S.A. 
RISC network 
1  Advanced Micro Devices Inc.  AMD  U.S.A. 
2  American Telephone & Telegraph Co.  AT&T  U.S.A. 
3  Apollo Computer  APOLLO  U.S.A. 
4  Arete Systems Corp.  ARETE  U.S.A. 
5  Bipolar Integrated Technology  BIPOLAR  U.S.A. 
6  Control Data Corp.  CDC  U.S.A. 
7  Cypress Semiconductor  CYPRESS  U.S.A. 
8  Fujitsu Ltd.  FUJITSU  Japan 
9  Data General Corp.  DATA-GEN  U.S.A. 
10  Digital Equipment Corp. (DEC)  DEC  U.S.A. 
11  Hewlett-Packard  Co.  H-P  U.S.A. 
12  Hitachi Ltd.  HITACHI  Japan 
13  Integrated Device Technology  INTEG-DT  U.S.A. 
14  Intergraph  INTERGRA  U.S.A. 
15  Kubota Corp.  KUBOTA  Japan 
16  LSI Logic  LSILOGIC  U.S.A. 
17  Lucky Goldstar Ltd.  LUCKY-G  South Korea 
18  Matsushita Elect. Industrial Co. Ltd.  MATSUSHT  Japan 
19  Metaflow Technologies  METAFLOW  U.S.A. 
20  Mips Consumer Systems  MIPS-CS  U.S.A. 
21  Motorola Inc.  MOTOROLA  U.S.A. 
22  National Cash Register Corp. (NCR)  NCR  U.S.A. 
23  Olivetti SpA.  OLIVETTI  Italy 
24  Performance Semiconductor  PERF-SEM  U.S.A. 
25  Philips N.V.  PHILIPS  Netherlands 
26  Prime Computer Inc.  PRIME  U.S.A. 
27  Racal  RACAL  U.K. 
28  Schlumberger N.V.  SCHLUMB  U.S.A. 
29  Siemens A.G.  SIEMENS  Germany 
30  Silicon Graphics  SILICONG  U.S.A. 
31  Stardent Inc.  STARDENT  U.S.A. 
32  Str.de Drv.Ind.de Matrriel  & d'Ass.  SODIMA  France 
33  NEC Corp.  NEC  Japan 
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Name  Code  Country 
34  Sun Microsystems  SUN-MICR  U.S.A. 
35  Tandem Computers Corp.  TANDEM  U.S.A. 
36  Tektronix Inc.  TEKTRONX  U.S.A. 
37  Texas Instruments Inc.  TI  U.S.A. 
38  Thomson S.A. (SGS-Thomson)  THOMSON  France/Italy 
39  Toshiba Corp.  TOSHIBA  Japan 
40  UniSoft  UNISOFT  U.K. 
41  Unisys Corp.  UNISYS  U.S.A. 
42  VLSI Technology Inc.  VLSI  U.S.A. 
43  Xerox Corp.  XEROX  U.S.A. 